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Posts Tagged ‘Securities Investors Association of Singapore’

Hyflux: Can believe or not?

In Corporate governance, Financial competency on 28/05/2019 at 7:31 am

Earlier this month, Utico, a UAE water utility offered to invest S$400 million in Hyflux, offering a binding agreement. But Oliver Lum and her board kaki are playing hard to get, telling the Arabs to go f*** a camel.

So Utico has gone on a massive PR exercise to put pressure on the Hyflux board via the retail holders of perpetual securities and preference shares.

In a media statement, after a meeting with SIAS, chief executive of Utico, Richard Menezes, made an offer to the retail investors in Hyflux perpetual securities and preference shares, if Hyflux accepted his offer, of a

“part cash redemption and also a hope for full redemption with a plan and exit option” …

“Full details can only be revealed later but as part of the overall deal, small investors of up to S$2,000 to S$3,000 could get 50 per cent cash redemption along with full redemption opportunity, while the rest of the investors could get a similar but staggered and cascade deal.”

“All investors will have an opportunity to get their money back … if they support the deal,” he added.

Read more at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/utico-offers-hyflux-s-small-investors-part-cash-redemption-as-11567048

He’s also scoring a lot of PR points for explaining why the company is making this offer to Hyflux’s junior creditors with perpetual securities and preference shares, instead of senior creditors.

“(Senior creditors) took an active business risk with ringside view, whereas (perpetual securities and preference shares) investors took a passive blind faith risk,” he said in the statement.

He said neither coupon nor principal was guaranteed in the offer prospectus and while trading at SGX, and morally there remains some responsibility from Hyflux for the predicament of the perpetual securities and preference shareholders.

To score even more points, he says:

Meanwhile, Utico said it could consider a listing in Singapore and “put some skin into the game” if it gets investors’ support for the deal.

As to the reality of the offer to retail perpetual securities and preference shares , it sounds like an extend and pretend game: both sides agree that the debt will be repayable sometime in the distant future, if at all. Tan ko ko.

Related posts

Hyflux: Sue those with money

Hyflux: “going concern” BS/ KPMG again and again

Hyflux on investor losses: “Not our fault, banksters at work”

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Hyflux fiasco shows why “book value” is BS

In Accounting, Corporate governance, Financial competency on 17/02/2019 at 1:12 pm

And why audited accounts are juz another genre of fiction: science fiction is closer to reality.

I tot these tots when I read Hyflux’s response to a question from the Securities Investors Association of S’pore (SIAS) which read:

On what basis was Tuaspring being valued at SGD1.4 billion? This has proven to be overstated by at least SGD900 million as Hyflux has confirmed any bids received in the 2018 sale process for Tuaspring were for less than Maybank’ s outstanding project finance debt of approximately SGD500 million?

This is what Hyflux said:

When Hyflux was first awarded the Tuaspring project in 2011, based on the financial model which modeled the cashflow projections from the project, the power plant was expected to generate profits from day one. This financial model was audited by an external financial model auditor and furnished to the offtaker. In 2013 when Tuaspring was able to secure a non-recourse project financing loan, the lender commissioned an independent market study of the project which arrived at similar conclusions supporting the book value of approximately SGD1.4 billion.

When the Tuaspring power plant entered into commercial operations in 2016, the lender commissioned another independent market study before the drawdown of the second tranche of the project finance loan, which valuation also then supported the book value ascribed to the Tuaspring project. However, while the 2017 divestment process attracted three preliminary non-binding bids that also supported the book value of the project, the 2018 sale process for Tuaspring during the moratorium did not yield a similar bid due to the limited number of parties pre-qualified to perform due diligence at such time. Please refer to https://www.hyflux.com/qa-from-second-noteholders-townhall-meetings/ for further details on the Tuaspring divestment process.

https://www.hyflux.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Hyflux-responses-to-SIAS-letter.pdf

So book value is what Hyflux or any company says it is. To be fair, this can only happen with the approval of the accounting prostitutes profession and other prostitutes experts.

Think I’m unfair?

This is Hyflux’s response as to how the major assets of Hyflux were valued, and in particular why no impairment write-downs were made:

All major assets of Hyflux are measured at fair value, in accordance with the Financial Reporting Standard (“FRS”) 39 –Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement and FRS 105 –Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations. These assets are assessed at the end of each reporting period to determine whether there is objective evidence that they are impaired, in accordance with FRS 36 –Impairment of Assets.

In accordance with the Group’s accounting policies (set out in the Annual Reports), an impairment loss, once determined, is recognised in the Income Statement in the relevant period.

Impairment losses recognised in respect of all non-derivative financial assets and non-financial assets, including investments, (if any) have been disclosed in the Annual Reports in the respective years.

The financial statements of Hyflux, as in all general purpose financial statements, have been prepared using the going concern basis of accounting.Under the going concern basis of accounting, the financial statements are prepared on the assumption that the entity is a going concern and will continue its operations for the foreseeable future.

https://www.hyflux.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Hyflux-responses-to-SIAS-letter.pdf

But Hyflux and the prostitutes accountants and other experts, can point out that the non-recourse lender (Maybank) “commissioned an independent market study of the project which arrived at similar conclusions supporting the book value of approximately SGD1.4 billion.”

If a leading Asean bank could screw up so badly, anti-PAP types shouldn’t be too upset that retail investors lost money.

Related posts:

A really curious incident

Did Hyflux’s auditors mislead?

 

Did Hyflux’s auditors mislead?

In Accounting, Corporate governance, Financial competency on 16/02/2019 at 11:44 am

Further to A really curious incident, where I criticised SIAS for not KPKBing early, here’s one criticism it got right, though why didn’t it raise this earlier, much earlier?

“On Mar 22 2018, KPMG provided a clean a clean audit report for Hyflux Group for the financial year 2017. On May 22 2018, Hyflux Limited and a number of subsidiaries filed for court protection from creditors,” SIAS said, asking what transpired between Mar 22 and May 22 in 2018.

Read more at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/hyflux-questioned-over-ceo-olivia-lum-remuneration-financial-11229034

Really shumething must be done about the audit prostitutes profession. Very related post:

A really curious incident

In Corporate governance, Financial competency on 15/02/2019 at 4:54 am
The silence of a self-proclaimed watchdog: only KPKBing when Hyflux was bust.
SIAS raises questions about Hyflux CEO’s remuneration amid financial troubles

Despite reporting losses of S$115.6 million in 2017, troubled water treatment firm Hyflux spent about S$2.7 million on remuneration for its key executives, with CEO Olivia Lum receiving between S$750,000 and S$1 million in salary, benefits and bonuses.

In addition to this “large remuneration”, Ms Lum also received more than S$60 million in dividends “in the time that shareholders and bond holders have seen their entire investment destroyed”, according to the Securities Investors’ Association (Singapore) (SIAS).

Highlighting these points, SIAS asked why the Hyflux founder – which has 34 per cent ordinary shareholding in the company – did not contribute her gains to the restructuring process. The investor watchdog also asked if Ms Lum would have any role in the Hyflux group after the firm’s restructuring.

These were just two of more than 40 questions put to Ms Lum and the Hyflux board by the investor watchdog in a letter issued on Monday (Feb 11) and signed off by its President and CEO David Gerald.

“SIAS, representing the interests of the numerous stakeholders of various securities, is seriously concerned that many questions regarding the operations, valuation and accountability of the board of directors of Hyflux have not been addressed, so as to help securities holders make an informed decision, with respect to the restructuring,” Mr Gerald said.

Read more at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/hyflux-questioned-over-ceo-olivia-lum-remuneration-financial-11229034

Like real, barking after things went wrong. Not when things were going wrong and things could possibly be done to rectify the situation. Talk of bolting the stable door after the horse bolted.

 

If SIAS was my watchdog, I’d have shot it. The audited accounts raised many red flags. It’s not as though, the debts, and cashflow issues were hidden. All public knowledge. So was thisBS?

“Hyflux Group has generated negative operating cashflow in every year since 2009. Was this highlighted to bondholders and shareholders? If so, in what form? Why did the Board continue to pay dividends, when the operating cashflow was negative and accumulate more debt during this time?”

The investor watchdog also highlighted that Hyflux, despite the negative operating cashflow, reported profits in each year before 2017 and asked how this was possible.

Whatever, I’ll return to the fact that it kept quiet earlier: why?

Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”

Holmes: “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”

Gregory: “The dog did nothing in the night-time.”

Holmes: “That was the curious incident.”

Silver Blaze by  Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

Barking show dog gets bitten

In Corporate governance on 17/01/2012 at 6:02 am

It had to happen. Someone got tired of SIAS’ posturings and finger pointings and decided to bite back.

www.profitableplots.com

Let’s see if SIAS has anything to say in response to these allegations, some very serious.

SIAS: Close it down

In Corporate governance on 14/10/2011 at 7:21 am

 Yesterday I read in BT that David Gerald, Mr SIAS, had found new blood to replace him. 

He should have considered closing it down, and then closed it down because if retail investors are not interested in helping themselves why should he and others waste their time helping them?

The retail investors deserve to be fleeced like sheep.

Think I am hard? “Most of the 70,000 SIAS members who had signed up so that SIAS would settle the Clob matter on their behalf have since abandoned the organisation, leaving SIAS with less than 100 active members now,” reports BT. .